



Washington State Foot and Mouth Disease Response Plan

ANNEX TO THE WASHINGTON STATE FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE
RESPONSE PLAN

This is a draft document focusing on foot-and-mouth disease response strategy and logistics in the state of Washington and is subject to change. This document does not represent national policy nor any policy of the Washington Department of Agriculture. This document is for planning purposes only and is constantly evolving as new information becomes available.

*The content of this annex on Food and Mouth Disease **must** be read in conjunction with the Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan as written and maintained by Washington State Dept. of Agriculture.*

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Record of Changes

Change Number	Date of Revision	Description of Change	Initials

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a severe and highly contagious viral disease affecting cows, pigs, sheep, goats, deer, and other animals with divided, or cloven hooves. It can also infect hedgehogs and Asian elephants, but they are considered animal “reservoirs.” Swine tend to be severely affected and are considered “amplifying hosts” because showing no or minimal clinical signs, but still be a source of disease transmission. Cattle are “indicator” species because they often become clinical but will recover.

Animals can develop a range of clinical signs with varying severity depending on the species. FMD can cause fever, blisters on the tongue and lips, in and around the mouth, on mammary glands, and/or around hooves. Other signs of illness may include depression, anorexia, excessive salivation, lameness, and reluctance to move or stand. Most adult animals do not die from FMD, but instead weaken and may recover, however they may never regain full productivity. Younger animals may not survive. Because clinical signs of FMD mimic signs of endemic diseases causing blisters ([Vesicular Stomatitis](#), [Senecavirus A](#), etc.), the recognition, identification, and confirmation of FMD may be delayed.

In the event of a FMD outbreak in the U.S., the primary transmission risk to Washington herds/flocks is direct transmission from infected animals to susceptible animals or indirect transmission from fomites (contaminated people, supplies, or equipment). Transmission from infected animals could occur from domesticated animals or wildlife. If infected, white tailed deer could potentially spread the virus but the role they would play in propagating an outbreak is thought to be limited. While feral swine can become infected with FMD and are reported in one bordering state (Oregon) and British Columbia; no county directly borders Washington and the introduction of FMD from feral swine is unlikely at this time. The risk of agro or bioterrorism in Washington is unknown but DSHS is always on alert.

FMD does not infect humans and is neither a food safety nor public health concern. Animals which pass ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection by the [USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service \(FSIS\)](#) at slaughter or a facility licensed and inspected by the Washington State Department of Agriculture Food Safety Program are safe for human consumption, even if the animals may have been exposed to or have recovered from FMD. Products passing inspection are able to enter normal commerce.

FMD causes production losses and hardships for farmers and ranchers. It also has serious impacts on livestock trade—a single detection of FMD will likely stop international trade completely for a period of time. The disease can spread widely and rapidly and has grave economic consequences.

Lastly, during an outbreak FMD may be incorrectly associated with [Hand, Foot and Mouth Disease](#) that affects humans. This confusion with an entirely unrelated condition could cause unnecessary public health concern.

Scope

A single FMD detection in any State could close international export markets for meat, dairy, and other products across the United States, causing billions of dollars in lost trade. While there is a vaccination against FMD, a [2019 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office](#) found that the number of doses stockpiled in the North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank may be sufficient to help control and eradicate a small, localized outbreak, but it is unlikely that they would be sufficient to stop a larger outbreak. However, new, “leaderless” attenuated vaccine technology is a promising new development that could help the U.S. meet vaccine demand and produce the vaccine domestically.

Impact

Economic losses due to the loss of animals, the expense of disposing thousands of pounds of animals and the economic impacts of replacing those animals along with decontamination are the immediate impacts. The potential for infection can be intentional or even inadvertent. Washington State University (WSU) states that: “Washington State’s location causes concern because of the connection it has many foreign ports and international travelers.” “... the concern does exist that a foreign animal disease outbreak could occur accidentally or by terrorist means.” Biosecurity risks include introduction of disease by international travelers that wear contaminated footwear and clothing onto a farm, farm

workers that have recently travelled, feed/ feedstuffs from endemic areas around the world, deliveries, imported animals and imported meat and meat products or feeding garbage to pigs. Additional impacts would include export bans live animals, meat and other animal products to countries not infected with the disease.

Therefore, the primary strategy to mitigate FMD's impact on Washington's agricultural economy is to prevent it from entering or eradicating it as quickly as possible if it does enter. This may be accomplished through instituting restricted and/or controlled movements of susceptible species if the virus is detected in the U.S. and stamping-out positive or epidemiologically linked herds/flocks in Washington.

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Chapter 2: Biosecurity Before, During and After an Outbreak in Washington

Biosecurity

- Farms should always employ important basic preventative biosecurity personnel policies that restrict employees (and visitors) from:
 - Entering a premises for a minimum of 5 days after arriving in the U.S. after visiting any country or area of the world experiencing active FMD cases;
 - Bringing any clothing (including footwear) that was worn when hunting white tailed deer or other ruminants, hunting feral swine, or visiting a country or area of the world experiencing active FMD cases before it is completely washed and laundered;
 - Entering a premises without adhering to the premises' established biosecurity protocols;
 - Bringing cellular phones and other outside materials that have not been properly disinfected onto a premises; and
- Controlling potential mechanical vectors (such as flies) that may be present on the premises.
- Other basic biosecurity principles.

Enhanced Biosecurity

Once FMD is diagnosed in (the US, the PNW, the State, in your county) WSDA places the responsibility of implementing good biosecurity practices on the producers and owners of a premises. At a minimum, WSDA recommends premises utilize existing enhanced biosecurity outbreak guidance available in the [NAHEMS Guidelines for Biosecurity](#) and those outlined in the [Secure Pork Supply \(SPS\)](#), [Secure Beef Supply \(SBS\)](#), [Secure Milk Supply \(SMS\)](#), and/or [Secure Sheep and Wool Supply](#). Also, premises should practice increased biosecurity practices, where appropriate, on a daily basis.

WSDA further recommends:

- Premises that do not allow pigs to have outdoor access utilize guidance available in the [Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Pork Production Biosecurity: Animals Raised Indoors](#) ;
- Premises that allow pigs to have outdoor access utilize USDA biosecurity recommendations as highlighted in the [USDA Biosecurity Checklist for Pigs with Outdoor Access](#) and well as the [Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Pork Production Biosecurity: Animals with Outdoor Access](#) ;
- Premises housing beef cattle on feedlots utilize guidance available in the [Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention: Beef Feedlots](#) ;
- Premises housing beef cattle on pasture utilize guidance available in the [Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention: Cattle on Pasture](#) ;
- Premises housing dairy cattle utilize guidance available in the [Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention: Dairy](#) ;
- Premises housing sheep utilize guidance available in the Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention: Sheep and Wool;
- All premises implement personnel policies that restrict employees (and visitors) from:
 - Entering a premises for a minimum of 5 days after arriving in the U.S. from a foreign country or area of the world experiencing active FMD cases.

Chapter 3: Classifications of an FMD Outbreak in relation to Washington

There are three classifications of an FMD outbreak in relation to Washington that would prompt WSDA to initiate a response. Formal notification from USDA of confirmed FMD cases outside of Washington. Any confirmation of FMD within Washington, which would be announced jointly by WSDA and USDA.

The three classifications of an FMD outbreak in relation to Washington are:

- Continental: FMD outbreak in Canada or Mexico but not in the U.S.
- Domestic: Confirmation of the first FMD case in the U.S. but not in Washington.
- In-State: Surveillance shows a positive case in Washington or epidemiologic evidence proving a connection of an Washington herd/flock to an infected herd/flock.

As stated in Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 16.36.40, “(1) The director may adopt and enforce rules necessary to carry out the purpose and provisions of this chapter, and including: preventing the introduction or spreading of infections, contagious, communicable, or dangerous diseases affecting animals in this state.”

WSDA is responsible for regulation related to livestock disease or other livestock emergencies among or affecting livestock in the state. As such, WSDA will serve as the State’s lead agency during an outbreak of a highly contagious disease affecting livestock in Washington.

During any FMD outbreak classification, WSDA may take the following actions:

Continental: FMD outbreak in Canada or Mexico but not in the U.S.

If FMD emerged in Canada or Mexico, WSDA would receive confirmation of an FMD outbreak in North America (Canada or Mexico) and trade status reports from USDA and/or through OIE notification. Trade “regionalization” may be employed.

Washington State Communication Efforts:

- Notify internal staff of the potential threat and initiate frequent communication to ensure stand-by readiness to deploy if necessary.
- Confer with Washington State University (WSU) Washington Animal Disease Diagnostics Laboratory (WADDL) to review submission procedures for the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), including the designated National Veterinary Service Laboratory (NVSL) [Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory \(FADDL\)](#).
- Communicate the threat to stakeholders and the public. WSDA will explain the disease and its effect on susceptible livestock, provide a description of the current response, make recommendations on how producers should protect their herds/flocks, explain how to report suspected cases or unusual disease, and provide resources to find more information. Complete details on communication pathways can be found in [Appendix 1: Communications](#).
- Import rules may include:
 - Special import permits or requirements for susceptible animals entering Washington.
 - Negative results to diagnostic tests. Diagnostic tests may be utilized to the highest degree possible to demonstrate a lack of evidence of infection.
- Notify cooperating state agencies, including but not limited to Washington Military Department Emergency Management Division (EMD), Washington Department of Health (DOH), Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW), and Washington Department of Transportation (WSDOT). EMD through the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) can coordinate the notification process.
- Notify veterinary and other professional associations, licensed and accredited veterinarians, livestock and trade associations, livestock producers, transit companies, and others of any changes to import regulation WSDA Animal Health Program Response
- USDA may impose import rules/order to restrict the movement of animals, animal products or equipment

through US ports of entry.

- The WA State Veterinarian may issue hold orders, quarantine orders or emergency rules or additional animal health or diagnostic tests in cases where there is a potential FMD threat to Washington agriculture.
- Coordinate with USDA VS APHIS to conduct historic tracing and surveillance of susceptible animals imported from the FMD-affected country within a minimum of two incubation periods (30 days) prior to the date of onset (or best approximation) of the index case.
 - Information may be gathered from a number of sources, including Certificates of Veterinary Inspection (CVIs), entry permits, producer records, brucellosis vaccination, brucellosis/ TB test records, livestock market records and/or slaughter facility records. These may include shipments from high-risk areas such as the infected country, production systems associated with the outbreak, or from other states with frequent movements from the infected country (e.g., movements from Mexico into Texas).
- Begin a more aggressive surveillance program to try to determine if FMD has been introduced into Washington. Available diagnostic testing will be utilized to the highest degree possible as a tool to help determine the FMD status of individual animals or herds/flocks. Tests may be conducted on:
 - Animals based on epidemiological link(s);
 - Animals showing suspicious clinical signs;
 - Recent samples submitted to Washington State University (WSU) Washington Animal Disease Diagnostics Laboratory (WADDL) for diagnosis of illness (i.e. targeted samples); and/or
 - Samples collected from concentration points, such as slaughter facilities, buying stations, livestock markets, etc.
- The incident will likely be managed in coordination with USDA and teams may be deployed to WA.
- If it is anticipated that the incident may require support beyond WSDA resources, WSDA will notify the Governor's office and coordinate with EMD to review needed resources and purchasing procedures to support a response.
- Continuously update the Governor's Office and EMD, and collectively anticipate future needs and evaluate the need for a Declaration of Emergency.

Domestic: Confirmation of the first FMD case in the U.S. but not in Washington

In addition to the activities and considerations listed for the Continental classification, if FMD is detected in the U.S. but not Washington, the following controls may be implemented:

Washington State Communication Efforts:

- Communicate with veterinary and other professional associations, licensed and accredited veterinarians, and others concerning the elevated threat, and provide information on monitoring the health of susceptible animals, and implementing enhanced biosecurity.
- Communicate with the Bovine Issues Working Group (BIWG) to provide livestock and trade associations, livestock producers, transit companies and others concerning the elevated threat, and provide information on monitoring the health of susceptible animals, and implementing enhanced biosecurity.
- Notify all producers, processors, and transit companies about the changes to Washington's import and movement criteria, and provide information about the permitting system and requirements.

Traceback, Stop Movement and Import Controls

In addition to the activities and considerations listed for the Continental classification, if FMD is detected in the U.S. but not Washington, WSDA may:

- Be in frequent communication with USDA to confirm:
 - Situational awareness of the FMD status of other states, including current response strategy (stamping-out), ring vaccination strategies and determining epidemiological links to Washington and other states;
 - The identity of FMD contacts that may have been transported to Washington within the last 30 days at a minimum; Status of trade with U.S.'s international trading partners;
 - If USDA is considering a Secretarial Emergency Declaration for the affected state(s).

- If USDA is recommended a national standstill order for all susceptible species.
- If a standstill order is implemented, immediately contact WSDOT and Washington State Patrol (WSP).
- Conduct surveillance to provide the highest degree of confidence possible that animal and/or animal product movements can occur to support business continuity without spreading infection. This may include monitoring for clinical signs and testing of live animals including, but not limited to, screening serum samples stored at the Washington State University (WSU) Washington Animal Disease Diagnostics Laboratory (WADDL) and/or testing animals at packing plants.
- Carefully evaluate the risk of animals and animal products to be imported. High-risk import products will be prohibited from entering Washington. Imports from certain geographical areas, production systems associated with the outbreak or other locations that may have epidemiological links to FMD Infected Premises will be carefully screened before being allowed to enter Washington.
 - Implement all, or aspects of, the Washington Protocol for Statewide or Emergency Quarantine (see Appendix 1 of the *Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan*).
 - Investigate imports into Washington within the last 30 days that may pose a risk to Washington livestock.
 - Continue the surveillance program for FMD to determine any epidemiological links to premises in Washington.
 - Ready the premises identification database to facilitate the identification of premises that may be at-risk or infected.
- Re-evaluate the threat and take action to protect Washington livestock. In addition to movement controls, actions may include epidemiological investigations, reminders of reporting requirements, and enhanced surveillance at livestock markets and slaughter facilities, among other activities.

WSDA and USDA Coordinated Response

- Confer with USDA to evaluate federal resources that may be available, if needed.
- Request EMD to notify appropriate personnel from supporting local and state agencies.
- Reassign and/or pre-position WSDA staff members to locations of anticipated need, such as to the State EOC, the Joint Information Center (JIC), or an existing Incident Command Post.
- Coordinate with EMD to anticipate needed resources and purchasing procedures to support a response to a potential outbreak.
- Request specific agencies provide support for response activities, which may include implementing a call center to respond to questions from veterinarians, producers, allied businesses, and the public, instituting Just-In-Time Training for response tasks, providing outreach to a variety of audiences to keep them aware of the threat and mitigation measures, and requesting supporting agencies send representatives to the JIC to develop and distribute messages to appropriate stakeholders.
- Consider deployment of the Reserve Veterinary Corps.
- Continue to monitor all states.
- Closely monitor any epidemiologically linked premises to determine what, if any, additional actions need to occur on that premises to stop the outbreak. This would designate a transition from the Continental to In-State classification.

In-State: Confirmation of FMD in Washington or Epidemiologic link of Washington herd/flock to infected herd/flock

In the event of confirmation of FMD in Washington or the epidemiologic link of a Washington herd/flock to an infected herd/flock, WSDA and USDA are the lead agencies for the emergency response to eradicate the disease and initiate recovery. The activities and considerations listed for the Continental and Domestic classifications would be followed in addition to enhanced localized and regionalized response efforts.

Emergency Management and Unified Command

- Form a Unified Command with USDA to exercise state and federal authority to protect animal health. Initially, local USDA representatives will participate. Positions may rotate to other USDA representatives over time and as more assistance is requested.
- Assign personnel to Incident Command System positions to manage the emergency response activities with the help of supporting agencies.
- Through EMD, request supporting agency representatives to report to the SEOC with knowledge of available capabilities and resources.
- Communicate through EMD with state agencies and local emergency managers and officials of the affected areas to determine local resource needs and availability.
- Notify the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to determine if FMD was intentionally introduced into Washington.
- Initiate regular briefings for the media and for information release to the general public through the JIC.

WSDA and USDA Coordinated Response, Containment, Eradication, Disposal and Recovery

Response

- Receive notification of an epidemiological contact from an Infected Premises, or may be notified of suspicious clinical signs in a susceptible animal in Washington.
- Conduct epidemiological investigations (with or without the assistance of the USDA) to identify Infected Premises and Contact Premises.
- Collaborate with USDA to dispatch a state or federal Foreign Animal Disease response team.
- Diagnostician (FADD) to conduct an investigation and collect diagnostic samples for laboratory submission. Divided samples will be provided to WSU WADDL and sent to the designated Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) for confirmation and virus isolation. An FADD investigation is conducted according to [VS Guidance Document 12001.2 - Policy for the Investigation of Potential Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging Disease Incidents \(FAD/EDI\)](#).
- Continue disease surveillance to detect other Infected Premises or potential spread of FMD

Containment

- Initiate containment activities on the Infected (or Suspect) Premises. Initially, in most cases this will include a hold order or quarantine order, setting up premises biocontainment, and a review of producer records to trace recent animal movements into and out of the herd/flock (see [Appendix 3: Mitigation, subsection: Quarantine](#)).
- Prompted by a positive laboratory result confirming FMD, establish a Control Area around the Infected Premises, and institute movement controls ([Appendix 3: Mitigation, subsection: Quarantine](#) and [subsection: Permitting](#)), as well as epidemiological tracing (see [Appendix 2: Epidemiological Investigation and Surveillance](#)).
- Require biocontainment/enhanced biosecurity protocols/Secure food supply plans to prevent spread of FMD from Infected Premises.
- Continue disease surveillance to detect new infections, and also to collect data to prove FMD freedom if possible.
- If not already instituted, implement a system of permitted movement to approve and document movements into, within, and out of the Control Area (see [Appendix 3: Mitigation, subsection: Permitting](#)).
- Decide the method of releasing a Control Area and restrictions imposed on movements into, out of, and within the Control Area. The Control Area may be released as a whole or in parts to gradually reduce the size. Considerations include:
 - Premises due to be released do not appear to pose a risk for further spread of FMD;
 - Results of epidemiological surveillance and confirmed/suspected cases in the vicinity;
 - Disease status of other neighboring premises;
 - Progress of the eradication effort and current response approach; and/or
 - Reasonable confidence that the non-infected premises due to be released will not be vulnerable to re-exposure (see [Appendix 3: Mitigation, subsection: Permitting](#)).

- Develop protocols for cleaning and disinfection to decontaminate buildings, areas and articles on the premises after infected animals have been removed. Protocols will be guided by [FAD PReP Guidelines: Cleaning and Disinfection](#).

Eradication

- Based on a stamping-out strategy dependent on the size of the herd/flock, implement a depopulation and or vaccination plan with greatest probability of depopulating the herd/flock in a timely manner (see [Appendix 3: Mitigation, subsection: Mass Depopulation](#)).
- Request FMD vaccinations from the USDA Veterinary National Stock Pile and implement the Washington FMD Vaccination Plan (see [Appendix 5: Vaccination](#)).
- Recommend slaughter or euthanasia of any exposed or recovered animals due to the chance that some may become long-term carriers.

Disposal

- Collaborate with Washington's Department of Ecology (ECY) to approve the animal owner's disposal plan for carcasses and other associated materials (see [Appendix 3: Mitigation, subsection: Carcass Disposal](#)).

Recovery

- Allow repopulation once infected/contagious animals have been removed and the environment of a premises is no longer a risk to spread FMD (through cleaning and disinfection or a fallow period - see [Appendix 4: Cleaning and Disinfection](#)). Conditions for repopulation may change if the response strategy transitions from stamping-out.
- Stockpile and implement the Washington FMD Vaccination Plan (see [Appendix 5: Vaccination](#)).

Appendix 1: Communications

Public Awareness and Education

Under ICS, a Joint Information Center (JIC) will be established as a central or virtual location, depending on needs, for all public information dissemination, public affair functions, and crisis communications. Under most circumstances, the Unified Command will appoint a public information officer (PIO) to act as the lead for a FMD outbreak. This PIO will coordinate the JIC with the MAC-G and other applicable stakeholders.

The JIC handles on-scene media and public inquiries, emergency public information and warnings, rumor and media monitoring, website updates and social media. The JIC will coordinate, clear with appropriate authorities, and disseminate accurate and timely information related to the incident. Information released to the public should be timely and include at least the following general information:

- The nature and extent of the emergency;
- Impacted or potentially affected areas of the state;
- Human health implications or lack thereof; and
- Activities carried out by government officials and industry leaders to respond to the outbreak and mitigate its effects.

WSDA will hold informational meetings, training sessions, and awareness campaigns with outside experts, government scientists, media, and industry early in the outbreak to educate the public and stakeholders. The educational campaigns may include:

- Emphasis on biosecurity;
- Educational and instructional materials, available in multiple languages and customized to target audiences and taking into consideration audiences with functional needs;
- State and federal web sites for additional information and guidance;
- Providing information to avian exhibitions and meetings;
- Worker educational materials for industry on methods of disease transmission and biosecurity;
- Specific outreach to small producers.

Industry Meeting

After official notification of a positive diagnosis of FMD, WSDA will hold industry meetings, when deemed necessary, to disseminate disease information and biosecurity protocols. For biosecurity reasons, such a meeting may be in the form of a webinar or teleconference. Target audiences are:

- Producers
- Emergency response teams (industry, state, and federal)
- Other state and federal agencies
- Universities
- Private veterinarians
- Feed and pet stores
- Fair Board
- Other interested stakeholders

After the outbreak has ended, public information records will be collected by the PIO and retained per the state records retention schedule. All public information media releases will be maintained in an electronic format when possible.

Communication Plan

Effective emergency management response depends on communication – the ability to maintain a common operating picture through the constant flow and sharing of information. Integrated communication forges a link among operational and support units to enable common awareness of the incident and actions to achieve the objectives of Incident Command. Equipment, systems, protocols, and expertise are needed to achieve this integration. Procedures and protocols governing communication among the emergency responders must be established in advance of an outbreak.

The objectives of the communication plan in the face of an animal disease emergency are as follows:

- Furnish accurate, timely, and consistent information
- Maintain credibility and instill public confidence in the State's ability to respond to an outbreak
- Minimize public panic and fear;
- Address rumors, inaccuracies, and misperceptions as quickly as possible; and
- Inform the public and producer what they can do to mitigate the disease or event in their lives and in their production systems

The goals, which will help to achieve the communication objectives, are as follows:

- Establish a network of stakeholders and systems for communication, prior to an incident or outbreak
- Test or exercise the systems for communication at regular intervals, prior to an outbreak
- Brief the media, public, industry, Congress, trading partners, and others on the outbreak and the actions being taken by WSDA, USDA, and other partners to control, contain, and eradicate the disease
- Highlight the importance of biosecurity best practices and steps that producers and owners can take to protect against infection
- Coordinate with USDA, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), U.S. Department of Interior (DOI), DHS, State agencies, local agencies, Tribal entities, and WSU and WSU Extension to ensure a consistent message regarding animal health, public health, and food safety


Internal Communications Planning

The Washington Department of Agriculture will follow internal communication processes as established by WSDA Communications Office. Internal information sharing and coordination will be supported by WSDA Rapid Response and Emergency Management and the Animal Health Program by developing the following for the incident:

- Division Crisis Communication Plan
- Incident Report
- Disease Response Checklist, Day 0; and Post Confirmation Checklist
 - Outlines initial communication contacts
- Emergency Response Contact List
 - Contact names and phone numbers for each pertinent agency
- Incident Action Plan
 - Form ICS 205 and ICS 205a for communication plans
- Animal Emergency Response Communication Retrieval Process
 - Process for logging messages from internal staff cell phones, desk phones, email, and assignment of personnel to return phone calls and emails
- Office Messaging Template
 - Narrative for office and field staff to use; includes: messaging to use within WSDA, phone recording, email response, and website

Incident Command Structure: Communication

The figure below indicates which ICS positions will have a role in communication activity:



The PIO/JIC will develop an external communications strategy, which the Incident Commander or Unified Command must approve before implementation. This plan should include the following:

- Designated line and staff responsibilities for the information teams
- Response team after-hours contact numbers
- Internal information verification and approval procedures
- Contact numbers for emergency response information partners
- Agreements on information release authorities, including who releases what, when, and how
- Procedures to secure needed resources to operate the public information and media operation 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and fund an 800 hotline number
- Regional and local media contact list
- Agreements and procedures to join the JIC, if activated
- Procedures to coordinate with field response teams
- Designated spokespersons for animal health issues and third party validators in an emergency
- Vehicles of information dissemination
- Key messages to stakeholder groups

External Communications Planning

External communication during an outbreak will be the responsibility of the State Veterinarian and the WSDA Communications Director. The State Veterinarian will direct and maintain communication with federal, state, and local government agencies and partners that have a statutory responsibility in emergency response. Additionally, the WSDA Communication Director will communicate and collaborate with livestock industry representatives throughout the incident as organized through the Bovine Issues Working Group (BIWG).

The BIWG Crisis Response Plan will serve as a guide for industry when communicating with the public through an animal health emergency. The BIWG Crisis Response Plan contains key messages, roles, and responsibilities and industry contact lists that will serve as an important external and internal communication resource during an incident. For specific information on cattle industry agencies and representatives BIWG Crisis Response Plan. In a situation where the


disease affecting cattle would also affect other livestock species such as pigs, sheep, and goats, those associations would also be included.

Correspondence and communication with the media and public regarding the incident will be directed and managed by the WSDA Communications Director. The WSDA Communications Director or assigned designate may assume the ICS role of Public Information Officer (PIO) upon activation of this plan. In the event another IMT is deployed to manage the incident, the WSDA PIO shall work in collaboration with the IMT, State EOC, State and local public health, livestock associations and dairy industry, federal agencies and local emergency management PIO(s) in a Joint Information Center (JIC).

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Washington Multi-Agency Staff Crisis Assignments

In the event of an industry-wide crisis, staff from any of the BIWG organizations likely to become involved in a response shall be asked to assume certain key roles. Washington multi-agency staff crisis communication assignments through the BIWG is outlined below:



Appendix 2: Epidemiological Investigation and Surveillance

During an FMD outbreak the following premises definitions will be used:

- Infected Premises (IP): any premises with laboratory confirmed FMD
- Contact Premises (CP): any premises with an established epidemiological link to an IP in the previous 30 days at a minimum.

The following are WSDA's initial goals of an FMD epidemiological investigation conducted in Washington:

- Identify each potential IP through tracing activities, assign a premises classification and investigation priority;
- Identify any CP (this includes all potential CP within a production system where sites may be separated by large geographic distances); and
- Characterize the nature of the FMD outbreak, identifying any potential lateral transmission pathways and mitigation strategies.

Identifying potential CP within the same production system may include, but is not limited to, WSDA auditing the following aspects of movement onto and off a premises:

- Live animal movement logs,
- Animal product movement logs,
- Feed delivery logs,
- Personnel logs,
- Visitor logs (both domestic and international),
- List of equipment shared between premises,
- Animal disposal logs (i.e. rendering, etc.), and
- Supply delivery logs (i.e. fuel delivery, etc.)

In addition to active investigations, the need for statewide FMD surveillance may become necessary. This will take two forms: 1) passive surveillance and 2) active surveillance.

Passive surveillance will occur from veterinarian and producer reporting of suspicious clinical signs and mortalities noted in susceptible animals. WSDA will widely communicate that anyone suspecting a possible FMD introduction into Washington reports it immediately to WSDA and/or the USDA. At which time either a WSDA or USDA FADD will be dispatched to the premises to conduct an investigation.

Active surveillance will occur through screening diagnostic samples that are collected on a regular basis. This would include any samples from susceptible animals submitted to the Washington Animal Disease Diagnostics Laboratory (WADDL), for any purpose as well as samples retained at the laboratory from the previous 60 days. Samples may be screened with diagnostic tests.

At the onset of the surveillance program any sample that screens positive would be sent to a designated National Veterinary Service Laboratory (NVSL) [Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory \(FADDL\)](#) for confirmatory testing. This would continue until testing became decentralized and more widely available at other laboratories. Depending on the capacity/capabilities of the Washington Animal Disease Diagnostics Laboratory (WADDL) and other reference laboratories, oral fluid testing in swine may also be incorporated into a statewide FMD surveillance program.


Appendix 3: Mitigation

Premise Designation and Zones

A critical component of a FMD response is the designation of zones, areas, and premises. The Incident Commander/Unified Command works with the Operations Section and Planning Section to (1) determine appropriate zones, areas, and premises designations in the event of a FAD outbreak and (2) reevaluate these designations as needed throughout the outbreak based on the epidemiological situation. These zones, areas, and premises designations are used in quarantine and movement control efforts. For details on the zones, areas, and premises, see the [FAD PReP - NAHEMS Guidelines: Quarantine and Movement Control](#).

Overview of Premises Designations:

Summary of Premises Designations		
Premises	Definition	Zone
Infected Premises (IP)	Premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, case definition, and international standards.	Infected Zone
Contact Premises (CP)	Premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed to the FAD, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to exposure to animals, animal products, fomites, or people from Infected Premises.	Infected Zone, Buffer Zone
Suspect Premises (SP)	Premises under investigation due to the presence of susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs compatible with the FAD. This is intended to be a short-term premises designation.	Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, Surveillance Zone, Vaccination Zone
At-Risk Premises (ARP)	Premises that have susceptible animals, but none of those susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible with the FAD. Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. At-Risk Premises may seek to move susceptible animals or products within the Control Area by permit. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises.	Infected Zone, Buffer Zone
Monitored Premises (MP)	Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises. Monitored Premises meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move susceptible animals or products out of the Control Area by permit.	Infected Zone, Buffer Zone
Free Premises (FP)	Premises outside of a Control Area and not a Contact or Suspect Premises.	Surveillance Zone, Free Area



Quarantine

The WSDA Director or State Veterinarian may issue an alert of emergency border restrictions when there is a confirmed diagnosis of a FAD in the livestock and poultry industries in another state. This may include restricted movement of livestock, poultry, animal transport vehicles, and products as appropriate for the particular disease. If a quarantine zone is required, WSDA will do so by Emergency Rule in accordance with [RCW 34.05](#) and under the authority given in [RCW 16.36.040](#).

Premises Quarantine

The Director or State Veterinarian may issue a quarantine order and enforce the quarantine of any animal or its reproductive products when:

- Any animal or its reproductive products are affected with or have been exposed to disease;
- Or when there is reasonable cause to investigate whether any animal or its reproductive products are affected with or have been exposed to disease, either within or outside the state.

Authority for control and movement restriction of **people** from infected premises resides under the jurisdiction of the Washington State Department of Health under the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 246-100-040 - Procedures for isolation or quarantine. See Appendix 1 of *Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan* for procedures for isolation and quarantine of livestock.

Quarantine Zone

WSDA will implement a quarantine zone by Emergency Rule in accordance with [chapter 34.05](#) RCW and under the authority of [RCW 16.36.040](#). Quarantine zones shall be established in accordance with [USDA FADPreP guidelines](#).

Overt disease or exposure to disease in any animal or its reproductive products need not be immediately obvious for a quarantine order to be issued or enforced. Any animal or animal reproductive product placed under quarantine may not be moved, transported, or sold without written approval from the director or until the quarantine is released. The quarantine shall remain in effect as long as the State Veterinarian deems necessary.

The State Veterinarian may issue a quarantine order and enforce the quarantine of any animal or its reproductive products when any animal or its reproductive products are affected with or have been exposed to disease or when there is reasonable cause to investigate whether any animal or its reproductive products are affected with or have been exposed to disease, either within or outside the state. The quarantine shall remain in effect as long as the director deems necessary.

The State Veterinarian may issue a hold order when overt disease or exposure to disease in an animal is not immediately obvious, but there is reasonable cause to investigate whether an animal is diseased or has been exposed to disease or import health papers, permits, or other transportation documents required by law or rule are not complete. Hold orders may also be issued when documentation required by law or rule are suspected to be fraudulent or further transport of an animal would jeopardize the well-being of the animal or other animals in Washington state.

Quarantine Release

Following the completion of cleaning and disinfection of the last infected premises in a quarantine zone, quarantine release will be determined by the AVIC and the State Veterinarian and agreed upon by the producer. When the designated timeline is met, restrictions can be removed and repopulation of non-restricted farms may begin. Surveillance zone and infected zone quarantines will be officially released. Premises quarantines may be lifted no sooner than 30 days after the cleaning and disinfecting of all affected facilities/premises if enhanced surveillance is being conducted in the quarantine zone.

When depopulation and vaccination are used, the lifting of quarantines will be related to the date when all sentinel animals are serologically negative on two consecutive tests that are conducted at least 30 days apart.

Control Area

During an FMD outbreak a Control Area will be established to contain the infection, target stamping-out activities, and control animal movements. However, during an FMD outbreak WSDA may expand the outer boundaries of the Control Area or include multiple premises within one production system in the Control Area based on the epidemiology or scale of the outbreak.

Permitting

Permitted/Controlled Movement

Washington relies on the National Secure Food Supply Plans for specific biosecurity, surveillance, and movement requirements for products moving to market from negative premises within a quarantine zone. See Appendix 1 of the *Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan* for routine movement restrictions including premises restrictions and tracing movement.

Permit System

Regulatory personnel will establish a permit system to manage all movements to and from infected premises, contact premises, and suspect premises. See Appendix 3 of the *Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan*.

Mass Depopulation

To maximize biocontainment procedures and reduce the overall viral burden of an infected premises the goal is to have all infected and exposed premises depopulated as soon as possible, preferably within 24 hours, after the confirmed diagnosis. Depending on circumstances, other options may need to be considered. Additional information on procedures to implement depopulation activities are contained in Appendix 6 of the *Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan*. As new methods of euthanasia or mass depopulation are discovered or approved by AVMA, they will be considered and implemented on a case by case basis after appropriate training and familiarization.

The size and strength of the animals, necessary restraint, as well as the safety and expertise of available responders may factor into WSDA's selection of appropriate depopulation methods. WSDA may consider various methods during an FMD outbreak and the method chosen may depend on resource availability, premises and herd/flock size, and worker safety concerns. However, regardless of the method chosen, if a producer wishes to seek indemnity for depopulated animals, USDA APHIS must preapprove the method. Any animal that dies prior to depopulation will not qualify for indemnity. Additional information on appraisal and compensation (indemnity) are contained in *Chapter 7 of the Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan*.

Carcass Disposal

In most cases during an FMD outbreak WSDA will require on-site disposal of animal carcasses and other associated materials. On-site disposal eliminates the need to move carcasses great distances and eliminates potentially moving live virus off the premises.

During an FMD outbreak in most cases WSDA will require the animal owner to utilize one of the following on-site disposal methods:

- Rendering,
- Burial (including above-ground)
- Incineration,
- Composting on-site
- Natural in-place decomposition.

The above options will be implemented in accordance with all local ordinances and state and federal laws, and guidelines provided by the Department of Ecology and the Department of Health. Explanations on disposing of carcasses

using burial, incineration, composting, and incineration can be found in the [USDA FAD PReP National Animal Health Emergency Management System Guidelines: Disposal](#)

Disposal Considerations

- Disease control
- Local/public concerns and regulations
- Worker health and safety
- Biosecurity
- Disinfection
- Cost
- Need for subject matter expertise
- Available carbon sources for composting
- Special equipment
 - Availability of equipment for moving carcasses
- Local health and environmental concerns (e.g. water tables and streams)

During a disease outbreak, there is a very high likelihood of generating massive amounts of contaminated biomass which can have a severe impact on public health. Biomass may include contaminated feed, grain, hay, litter, and manure. If composting is being used as a disposal method for animal mortality, these materials may be included in the compost windrows.

Additional information on procedures for disposal can be found in Appendix 7 of the *Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan*.

Appendix 4: Cleaning and Disinfection

Cleaning and disinfection (C&D) procedures are a crucial part of a FMD response. The potential for spread or transfer of microorganisms can occur from the direct or indirect contamination of a premises, equipment, vehicles, personnel, and the movement of animals or animal products. Highly contagious diseases may spread through the movement of infected animals, animal products, or fomites (feces, bedding, vehicles, harness, etc.) and convey disease agents to susceptible animals.

Where a contagious disease is involved, vehicles, holding pens, equipment, and various facilities must be cleaned and disinfected. With highly contagious diseases, the C&D procedures extend to the entire premises. Personnel involved with C&D functions must be knowledgeable about general C&D principles, methods, and procedures.

Cleaning and disinfecting (C&D) infected or dangerous contact premises will be the primary responsibility of the owner.

- The owner may be compensated by USDA for certain expenses at a rate established prior to C&D activities if funding is available.
- State or federal personnel will monitor the progress of C&D activities and will conduct inspections of each phase to ensure compliance with this protocol.
- WSDA or USDA authorized personnel must document the successful completion of C&D.

WSDA or USDA personnel duties include:

- Ensure that C&D protocols are included in facility site plan.
- Determine and assign adequate personnel to accomplish C&D.
- Review C&D protocol with facility management and establish timelines.
- Ensure vector and pest control programs are in place.
- Ensuring movement of manure and other miscellaneous contaminated items are in accordance with written disposal plan.

It is important that any physical or chemical processes used to C&D an infected premises reduce, remove, inactivate or destroy pathogenic microorganisms. C&D process should be consistent with current scientific knowledge for virus destruction.

Procedures for cleaning and disinfecting both commercial and non-commercial premises are outlined in Appendix 8 of the *Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan*.

Additional information on these disinfectants can be found on the [USDA APHIS webpage](#).

Appendix 5: Vaccination

NOTE: The Washington FMD Vaccination Plan is currently under development between WSDA, USDA, DOH and Washington State University.

The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) program, within the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Surveillance, Preparedness and Response Services Logistics Center, holds or has access to veterinary supplies, equipment, animal vaccines, and human antiviral medications ready to deploy within 24 hours. The program also maintains contracts with all-hazards response companies, which can quickly provide large numbers of trained personnel and equipment to assist a State when it does not have enough of its own personnel and equipment to depopulate, dispose, and decontaminate. The NVS Program provides States with the resources and countermeasures they need to respond to a damaging animal disease outbreak.

WSDA maintains the Washington State NVS Plan to ensure resources can be acquired, received, stored, staged, and distributed for a large outbreak response after local supplies have been exhausted.

For more information, visit the NVS program [webpage](#).

While vaccines against FMD exist, there are seven known types and more than 60 subtypes of the FMD virus and immunity to one type does not provide cross protection. Instead, vaccines must be closely matched to the viral strain circulating.

New, "leaderless" attenuated vaccine technology is a promising new development to help the US meet vaccine demand and produce the vaccine domestically. FMD is RNA single stranded virus with lots of diversity in serotypes. Subtypes may or not be protective, making stockpiling a guessing game and difficult. Using "leader" protease to construct a way to safely make inactivated modified strain vaccine that swaps out the genetic code for the structural strain you need onto a "backbone" that is avirulent in animals. Because attenuated strains can be pulled of the select agent list, this technology could be used domestically in the United States. PCR and sequencing work will allow vaccine strains of virus to be differentiated from fully virulent field strains of FMD.

FMD vaccine provides immunity for up to six months. Cattle, sheep, and goats require a single vaccine dose for full immunity, while swine require two doses two weeks apart. Animals would need to be re-vaccinated every six months for as long as vaccination is being used as a control measure. In the event of a FMD detection in Washington, WSDA will work with USDA APHIS to vaccinate at risk animals and stop further spread. All vaccinated animals will be required to have at least one form of official individual identification. Vaccination Strategies include:

- Vaccinate-to-kill: killing means any procedure which causes the death of an animal that does not enter the human food chain.
- Vaccinate-to-slaughter: slaughter means any procedure which causes the death of an animal by bleeding where the animal may enter the human food chain.
- Vaccinate-to-live: the animal is allowed to live out its useful life-span.

FMD-free status will not be able to be established until the long-term control and eradication program is successful. FMD-free with vaccination status may be an intermediary step to FMD-freedom without vaccination\FMD-free status with vaccination can be attained 2 years after the last outbreak as long as there is no evidence of virus circulation within the past 12 months ([OIE TAHC Article 8.8.3](#)). If vaccination is stopped, FMD-free status may be attained 12 months after the last evidence of FMD infection and the last FMD vaccine was administered ([OIE TAHC Article 8.8.2](#)).

If the FMD-free status with vaccination can be attained, it is expected few countries will resume trade with the U.S. as long as they can access sources of animal protein from countries that are FMD-free without vaccination. If FMD-free status without vaccination can be attained as recognized by OIE, it is expected to take much longer for the U.S. trading partners to recognize the status and resume trade.

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